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INTRODUCTION
Courts and legal scholars regularly debate and criticize the
deleterious effects of frivolous litigation. These lawsuits needless tax
litigants, wastefully drain judicial resources, and potentially stymie
society and the economy as a whole. 1 As a result, ethical, procedural
* J.D., LLM (Antitrust); Assistant Attorney General, New York State Attorney
General’s Office, Antitrust Bureau. The views expressed here are those of the author and do
not reflect those of the New York State Department of Law or the Antitrust Bureau.
1. For a summary of common criticisms pertaining to frivolous litigation, see, e.g.,
John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers’ and Executives’
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and substantive rules have been crafted to attempt to deter these illfavored actions. 2 However, many fail to consider that frivolous
litigation may also be employed as a tactic to hinder competition.
Frivolous litigation may have detrimental effects beyond the
litigants involved and courts. In certain situations, such litigation may
harm competition by adversely effecting conduct of other (nonlitigating) market participants, such as suppliers, distributors,
purchasers, and even consumers. Consequently, it has long been held
that objectively baseless—or “sham”—litigation that is done to impede
competition and which has that effect may violate the antitrust laws.3
Nonetheless, many scholars and courts continue to underrate or even
overlook the injury caused by anticompetitive sham litigation. This
article uses the nomenclature “antitrust sham litigation” to refer to
antitrust claims (or counterclaims) predicated on sham litigation.
Antitrust challenges to sham litigation arise in various contexts
involving a variety of factual and legal claims. However, one
commonality is that many such cases appear to focus exclusively on
the time the case was initially filed. 4 That is, the crux of the claim is
that at the time filed, the lawsuit was baseless and filed for an improper
purpose. 5 Indeed, the author is not aware of any reported, successfully
litigated case where an antitrust claim was based on a party
maintaining a baseless lawsuit. 6 As modern litigation is often lengthy,
complex, and resource intensive, it is not improbable that, regardless of
the merits of the action when filed, at some point in the litigation
process, it may become manifestly evident that no reasonable litigant
could expect success on the merits. And at that point, maintaining the
action is likely to be objectively baseless and unjustifiable.
Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 26 (1998); Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist,
Jurors’ Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation
Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 85, 95 (1992); John W. Wade, On Frivolous
Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L.REV. 433,
433 (1986).
2. See infra Parts II and III.
3. See, e.g., Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
62 (1993); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972);
Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broadcasting Corp., Inc., 219 F.3d 92, 100–01 (2d Cir.
2000).
4. See, e.g., Handgards Inc. v. Ethicon Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1288–89 (9th Cir. 1984);
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals v. Roxane Labs, No. 2:05-CV-889, 2007 WL 894473, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 21, 2007).
5. See id.
6. While the author is aware of cases where both the filing and maintaining the action
was alleged to be a sham, those opinions focus primarily on the filing of the suit (possibly
because if it is found that the litigation was a sham when filed, maintaining it was certainly
so as well). See id.
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Continuing to litigate a baseless lawsuit with the purpose and
effect of impeding competition may violate the antitrust laws. As an
example, in the context of pharmaceuticals, branded drug
manufacturers often sue generic drug manufactures for patent
infringement. In many of these cases, an antitrust claim is made
against the branded drug manufacturer, alleging that the infringement
litigation was objectively baseless and made solely for the purpose of
delaying generic competition. And while antitrust challenges to sham
litigation are not limited to the pharmaceutical context, for several
reasons these cases are particularly useful in revealing potential
anticompetitive effects of sham litigation. First, the rising costs of
prescription drugs has long been an issue of national concern. 7 And
because generic drugs are usually substantially cheaper than their
branded counterparts, encouraging vigorous generic competition offers
a means of reducing these costs. Second, the focus of the dispute, i.e.
whether a generic drug infringes upon a branded drug’s patents,
suggests that in certain situations the inquiry need not be extensive.
For instance, a cursory comparison of the generic’s product (or
method) to the patented formulation (or method) may be all that is
necessary to demonstrate non-infringement. 8 Third, because of certain
intrinsic features of its regulatory framework, pharmaceuticals is an
area where proving anticompetitive effects of sham litigation may be
relatively easy (i.e., compared to in other contexts). 9 Indeed, the
pharmaceutical industry has long been criticized as an industry in
which companies have been able to successfully manipulate the
regulatory process with anticompetitive results. 10 Part II provides a

7. E.g.,Elizabeth Rosenthal, The Soaring Price of a Simple Breath, N.Y. Times. Oct.
13, 2013 at A1 (finding that drug costs are 10% of the country’s $2.7 trillion annual health
bill). According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Center for
Medicare & Medicaid Service, retail prescription drug spending in 2012 was about $263.3
billion. See National Health Expenditure 2012 Highlights, CTR. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., (Jan. 9, 2013, 8:34 AM), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Dataand-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/
highlights.pdf.
8. See, e.g., AstraZeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd., No. 07 Civ.
6790(CM), 2010 WL 1375176, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010). Concededly,
infringement analysis is often not a simple task.
9. See infra Part IIB, discussing how the mere filing of litigation by a branded drug
manufacturer may delay approval of a generic version of the drug—and thus the cost
reductions associated with generic competition—for at least 30 months.
10. See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676
(2012) (“In the late 1990’s, evidence mounted that some brands were exploiting this [HatchWaxman] statutory scheme to prevent or delay the marketing of generic drugs . . .”);
JEREMY BULOW, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, in 4 INNOVATION POLICY AND

ZAIN FINAL

732

8/21/2014 4:08 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

basic overview of applicable legal principles, i.e., antitrust, patents,
pharmaceuticals, and laws governing frivolous litigation. 11 Part III
discusses pharmaceutical cases where the litigation is alleged to be a
sham due to non-infringement (rather than because of patent invalidity,
fraud or inequitable conduct). 12 Part IV provides an analysis and
makes the case for antitrust liability for maintaining baseless litigation
in appropriate circumstances. 13 Finally, Part V offers a short
conclusion. 14
II. BACKGROUND OF APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The following provides a short background on the applicable laws
and legal principles. In addition to antitrust and patents, a brief
summary of laws governing pharmaceuticals and frivolous litigation is
provided.
A. Antitrust Law & Sham Litigation
The antitrust laws are intended to protect competition and
consumers. 15 The Sherman Act is the cornerstone of these laws and
has been evaluating whether conduct is anticompetitive for well over a
hundred years. 16 It proscribes both joint conduct among firms that
“unreasonably” harms competition 17 as well as “monopolization.” 18 In

THE ECONOMY 145 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds. 2004); Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming
the Hatch-Waxman System: How Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain
Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug Market. 29 J. LEGIS. 21, 21 (2002); Generic
Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (July, 2002).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws
in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”). Consumer
welfare is the primary focus of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla. v. Clear Channel
Commc’ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1072 (11th Cir. 2004); K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs. v.
Walker Manufacturing, 61 F.3d 123, 128 (2nd Cir. 1995). See also Philip Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW § 6.04d (3rd ed. 2004).
16. Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1–7 (2012)).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits certain joint conduct
that harms competition, providing in part: “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” Id. Despite its broad, prohibitive terms, it
has long been held that Section 1 only condemns “unreasonable” restraints. Standard Oil
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examining whether conduct is “unreasonable” for antitrust purposes,
courts typically determine whether the challenged conduct is, on the
whole, anticompetitive, by evaluating and balancing all anticompetitive
effects against pro-competitive justifications. 19 This inquiry, termed
the “rule of reason” in antitrust parlance, is both flexible and fact
specific, and usually requires an assessment of the relevant industry,
the firms involved in the litigation, the nature of the conduct being
challenged as unlawful, all asserted pro-competitive business
justifications for the conduct, and the actual and likely effects of the
conduct. 20
Monopolization may be described as exclusionary conduct, i.e.,
conduct other than competition on the merits and done for the purpose
of obtaining or maintaining monopoly power. 21 It has two elements:
“(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2)
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 2 (1910).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in part: “[e]very person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” Id.
19. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918). Specifically, the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id.
20. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW
HANDBOOK 160 (2012-2013 ed.). Because this analysis is extensive and often resourceintensive, courts have identified circumstances when it may be truncated or even obviated.
For example, it has long been held that certain types of conduct are so likely to have
substantial anticompetitive effects and to have no significant procompetitive benefits that
such conduct may be condemned outright and held to be per se illegal, i.e., without any
assessment of its particular effects. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958) (“[T]here are certain agreements or practices which, because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable, and therefore illegal, without any elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use.”). Alternatively, conduct that is not
deemed per se illegal, but nevertheless “appears likely, absent an efficiency justification, to
restrict competition and decrease output,” may be presumed to be “unreasonable” without an
extensive analysis— although the presumption is rebuttable upon plausible and legally
cognizable pro-competitive justification(s). See, e.g., Polygram Holding Inc. v. FTC, 416
F.3d 29, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). This type of analysis is
sometimes referred to as a “quick look” analysis. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756, 763 (1999).
21. E.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
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the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.” 22 Civil remedies for an
antitrust violation may include an injunction, 23 restitution, 24
disgorgement, 25 and treble damages. 26
Filing frivolous lawsuits has the potential to be anticompetitive
regardless of whether done to protects a firm’s market power or as a
joint strategy among firms to impede competition. Litigation is often
costly, and thus if meritless, may thwart or undermine competition. 27
For example, baseless litigation filed by a dominant firm against a
competitor may deter suppliers and/or purchasers from dealing with the
competitor due to anxiety over provoking litigation or disfavored
treatment by the dominant firm. And even a company without any
apprehension about retaliation from the dominant firm may nonetheless
decline to do business with the competitor so as to avoid any legal
uncertainties (such as may be the case when the competitor’s product is
alleged to be infringing a patent).
Although antitrust is primarily concerned with the protection of
competition, it recognizes that in certain, limited circumstances,
competition concerns may have to defer to other policy goals. 28 As a
result, certain conduct has been granted immunity from antitrust
liability, regardless of the extent of anticompetitive effects.29 For
example, two of the most commonly known of these immunities are the
statutory exemption relating to certain acts by organized labor, 30 and
the exemption applying to professional baseball. 31 More relevant is the
22. Id.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 26.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 171–72 (1948).
25. See id.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
27. So long as the baseless litigation impedes or even interferes with the competitive
process, there is an argument that it may be anticompetitive, regardless of whether it result is
any measure anticompetitive effects.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229–31.
29. See id.
30. See Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70–73 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 101–110) (2012). The purpose of the statute was discussed by the Supreme
Court in Hutcheson:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the Clayton Act by
infusing into it the immunized trade union activities as redefined by the later Act.
In this light [section] 20 removes all such allowable conduct from the taint of
being a ‘violation of any law of the United States’, including the Sherman Law.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 236.
31. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (“Congress had no
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust
laws.”); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972) (upholding the Toolson decision).
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Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which is based on constitutional principles
supporting the right to petition the government, and provides that
“[t]hose who petition government for redress are generally immune
from antitrust liability.” 32 Courts have interpreted Noerr-Pennington
immunity to include the filing of litigation for the purpose of
vindicating legal rights. 33 Noerr-Pennington immunity thus
subordinates antitrust’s concerns that litigation may be used as an
anticompetitive weapon, 34 in favor of broadly permitting the
enforcement of legal rights via litigation.
Antitrust immunity granted by Noerr-Pennington is not without
limits, however. Rather, antitrust attempts to deal with the tension
caused by allowing bona fide litigation and yet still curbing abusing,
anticompetitive lawsuits by denying any immunity to frivolous
litigation. Accordingly, antitrust immunity is not granted to litigation
that is a mere “sham,” i.e., “encompass[ing] situations in which [a]
person use[s] the government process—as opposed to the outcome of
that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.” 35 Litigation that is both
objectively baseless “in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits,” and is subjectively
improper, i.e., “conceals ‘an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor,’” is thus not afforded antitrust

32. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56
(1993). The so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine is the result of two Supreme Court cases:
E. R.R. President’s Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1965) and United
Mine workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In Noerr, the Court held that
concerted efforts to seek legislative relief were immune from antitrust liability, even though
they may be anticompetitive. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136. In Pennington, concerted petitioning
efforts by mineworkers and mines seeking higher minimum wages for companies selling
coal to a federal agency were held to be immune. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 661.
33. See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11
(1972) (holding that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine did not apply where defendants had
sought to intervene in licensing proceedings for competitors because the intervention was
done to harass competitors).
34. An example of an area where much concern has been raised about potentially
anticompetitive litigation is litigation by “patent trolls,” entities that acquire patents for the
sole purpose of monetizing them via litigation or licensing rather than using them to
innovate. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives
and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1573–74
(2009); Robin M. Davis, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent Injunctions
in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 and Ebay v.
Mercexchange, 17 CORNELL J.L & PUB. POL’Y 431, 431–32 (2008); J.P. Mello,
Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 388,
388 (2006); Joe Beyers, Perspective: Rise of the Patent Trolls, CNET NEWS
(Oct. 12, 2005),
http://news.cnet.com/rise+of+the+patent+trolls/2010-1071_35892996.html.
35. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).
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immunity. 36 However, proving that litigation is a “sham” under NoerrPennington merely strips a litigant of antitrust immunity; it does not
impose liability by itself. 37 Rather, “even a plaintiff who defeats the
defendant’s claim to Noerr immunity by demonstrating both the
objective and subjective components of a sham must still prove a
substantive antitrust violation.” 38
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act
The high and rising cost of health care in the United States is an
issue of national importance and concern. It is estimated that in 2010,
total health care expenditures accounted for nearly eighteen percent of
gross domestic product. 39 And pharmaceuticals continue to be a
significant portion of that cost, estimated at over $263 billion in 2012. 40
In the United States, the sale of pharmaceuticals is heavily
regulated. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (“Act”) and its
implementing regulations govern, inter alia, the manufacturing, sale
and marketing of pharmaceuticals in the United States. 41 Under the
Act, anyone seeking to bring a new drug to market must submit a New
Drug Application (“NDA”) with the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) and provide scientific data demonstrating that the drug is safe
and effective for its intended use.42 A company filing an NDA must
also provide FDA with information on all composition or method
patents that it claims covers the drug for which it seeks approval and
“with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably

36. Prof’l Real Estate Investors 508 U.S. at 60–61 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144). A
similar type of antitrust claim is enforcement of a fraudulent procured patent. See, e.g.,
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965) (“The
enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of §2 of the
Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a §2 case are present.”). Sham
litigation and Walker-Process claims are similar, but distinct legal theories. Nobelpharma
AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“PRE and Walker
Process provide alternative legal grounds on which a patentee may be stripped of its
immunity from the antitrust laws; both legal theories may be applied to the same conduct.”).
37. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 61.
38. Id.
39. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER 1 (May
2012),
available
at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/01/7670-03.pdf
40. See National Health Expenditure 2012 Highlights, CTR. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads
/highlights.pdf..
41. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C §§ 351–360eee4 (2012).
42. 21 U.S.C § 355(b)(1); See also Caraco Pharm. Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk A/S,
132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012).
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be asserted.” 43 FDA may approve an NDA for one or multiple uses. 44
Once an NDA is approved, FDA lists the drug, along with information
about the applicable patents, in its publication “Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” commonly
referred to as the “Orange Book.” 45
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act, 46 commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman
Act, amending the Act to encourage generic entry by permitting a
quicker, easier means for generic drugs to come to market. 47 Under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, companies seeking to market generic versions of a
drug that has already been approved pursuant to an NDA may obtain
FDA approval by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA), and demonstrating that their generic version is
“bioequivalent” to the drug approved under the NDA. 48 Approval of
an ANDA is limited to the same uses approved for the NDA, and is
contingent upon compliance with additional substantive and procedural
requirements, including having to evaluate whether its proposed
generic would infringe upon any patent(s) listed in the Orange Book as
covering the NDA. 49 Specifically, the ANDA filer must certify one of
the following: (I) no patent information is listed in the Orange Book
for the drug approved by the NDA; (II) the listed patent(s) have
expired; (III) the listed patents will expire before the generic product is
marketed; or (IV) the patents listed are invalid or will not be infringed
by the generic. 50 When a generic company challenges a patent’s
validity or asserts non-infringement—referred to as a “paragraph IV
43. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G).
44. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676.
45. Id. See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (Feb. 2014), available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm.
46. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1984)).
47. E.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Congress
explained that the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act is ‘to make available more low cost
generic drugs.’”) (citation omitted); Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc.,
552 F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly referred to as the ‘Hatch-Waxman Act’ or ‘HatchWaxman,’ was passed to facilitate the approval of generic versions of brand-name drugs.”).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). A generic is “bioequivalent” to a branded drug when
“the rate and extent of absorption of the generic drug is not significantly different from the
rate and extent of absorption of the branded drug, when administered at the same dosage. Id.
§ 355(i)(8)(B).
49. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii); see also Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676 (“Because the FDA
cannot authorize a generic drug that would infringe a patent, the timing of an ANDA’s
approval depends on the scope and duration of the patents covering the brand-name drug.”).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV).
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certification”—it must also set forth “a detailed statement of the factual
and legal basis for the applicant’s opinion that the patent is not valid or
will not be infringed.” 51 A limited exception to this requirement is
when the ANDA seeks approval for a drug use that is not covered by
any patent listed in the Orange Book. 52 Under those circumstances, the
generic may instead provide a statement asserting that its ANDA does
not seek approval for any use claimed by any Orange Book patent (i.e.,
it seeks to market the drugs only for approved but unpatented uses). 53
The Hatch-Waxman Act creates a unique method for branded and
generic drug manufacturers to resolve patent issue. Rather than
requiring a generic drug manufacturer to first create and distribute a
potentially infringing product (the usual prerequisite to infringement
litigation), the Act allows patent litigation to go forward prior to the
sale and even FDA approval of a generic product. 54 Thus, the Act
provides that the mere filing of a paragraph IV certification is an
“artificial act of infringement,” permitting the holder of the NDA to file
an infringement action against the generic manufacturer—even though
no infringing product is on the market (as FDA has not yet approved
the ANDA). 55 Thereafter, if the NDA holder initiates patent litigation
51. Id. § 355(b)(3)(D)(ii).
52. See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1681–82. See also Warner Lambert v. Apotex, 316 F.3d
1348, 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Bayer Schering Pharma v. Lupin, 676 F.3d 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)(no infringement when a generic drug manufacturer’s ANDA only seeks FDA
approval to market its drug for unpatented uses)..
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). In such cases, the generic must submit a proposed
label that “carves out” the NDA’s method patent. E.g., Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1682; Bayer
Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin, Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2012); AstraZeneca
Pharms. LP v. Apotex Corp., 669 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Where the Orange
Book lists a method of use patent that ‘does not claim a use for which the applicant is
seeking approval,’ an applicant may instead submit a statement under 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)(viii) averring that the ANDA excludes all uses claimed in the patent.”) (citation
omitted). Thus, “a patented method of using a drug can only be infringed under [section]
271(e)(2) by filing an ANDA that seeks approval to market the drug for that use.”
AstraZeneca, 669 F.3d at 1379 (citing Warner–Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d
1348, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Thus, an ANDA seeking to market a drug not covered by a
composition patent for unpatented methods of treatment cannot infringe under section
271(e)(2). Id. at 1354–55 (“[W]e conclude that it is not an act of infringement to submit an
ANDA for approval to market a drug for a use when neither the drug nor that use is covered
by an existing patent, and the patent at issue is for a use not approved under the NDA.”).
54. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D).
55. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990). See also In re
Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., Nos. 08–2431 (direct), 08–2433 (indirect), 2012 WL
1657734, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012) (“An infringement inquiry triggered by an ANDA
filing is focused on the product that is likely to be sold following FDA approval. Because
the potentially infringing drug has not yet been marketed when the patent holder files suit,
the inquiry is a hypothetical one that asks the fact finder to determine whether the drug that
will be sold upon approval of the ANDA will infringe the asserted patent.”) (citing Bayer
AG, 212 F.3d at 1248–49).
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against a company which submitted a paragraph IV certification, FDA
approval of that generic company’s ANDA is automatically delayed for
thirty months or until the patent is held to be invalid or not infringed. 56
In contrast, if the NDA holder does not file suit within 45 days, FDA
may approve the ANDA immediately, provided that all other
conditions for approval have been met, i.e., the drug is deemed safe and
efficacious. 57 By this means, the Act creates a way for the generic and
branded drug manufacturers to work out patent disputes prior to the
generic incurring the cost of entry and production (as well as avoiding
damages for infringement).
C. Patent Law
Whoever invents a useful, novel, and non-obvious process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter may obtain a patent on
that invention. 58 A patent grants its holder (the “patentee”) the “right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention.” 59 One who makes, uses or sells a product covered by a
patent without a patentee’s authorization is said to have infringed the
patent. 60
Patents are issued by the United States Patent & Trademark
Office. 61 A patent document contains various sections. 62 Of
particularly importance is the patents’ “specification” and its
“claims.” 63 The specification contains a “written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains” to make or use the invention. 64 Each
patent has at least one claim, in which the inventor must “explicitly
identify[y] the subject matter of the invention and particularly poin[t]
out and distinctly clai[m] the subject matter” of the invention. 65 “The

56. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 677–78.
57. Id. at 677; 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C). See also Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If a patent holder fails to bring an
infringement action within forty-five days of receipt of a Paragraph IV notification, it loses
the
right
to
the
thirty-month
automatic
stay
. . .”).
58. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2012).
59. Id. § 154(a)(1).
60. Id. § 271(a).
61. Id. § 153.
62. Id. § 154(a)(1).
63. Id. § 112.
64. Id. § 112(a).
65. Id. § 112(b).

ZAIN FINAL

740

8/21/2014 4:08 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

claim ‘define[s] the scope of a patent grant’” 66 by identifying the
“metes and bounds of the claimed invention.” 67
A patentee may file suit for infringement against one who makes,
sells or uses the patented invention. 68 “Victory in an infringement suit
requires a finding that the patent claim ‘covers the alleged infringer’s
product or process,’ which in turn necessitates a determination of ‘what
the words in the claim mean.’” 69 The process of analyzing whether
there has been patent infringement typically requires two steps. First, a
court must construe or interpret the meaning of the claims. 70 While
this starts with evaluating the claims themselves, the court may also
look to a patents’ specification to the extent it assists in interpreting the
meaning of claims. 71 Second, the court will compare defendant’s
product or method to the patent and conclude whether there is an
infringement (i.e., that there is a match, in layman’s terms). 72
Successfully proving infringement will afford the patentee the right to
seek damages 73 and an injunction. 74 A finding of infringement does
not necessarily guarantee victory for the patentee, however. A
defendant may also attack the validity of the patent, 75 i.e., there is no
liability for infringing an invalid patent.
D. Liability for Frivolous Lawsuits
Antitrust is not the only means by which the law attempts to curb
frivolous litigation. Indeed, one may question why antitrust—which
focuses on competition—is needed for such a task (or even
appropriate). However, as maintained infra, antitrust liability is
necessary in certain situations where other means of deterring frivolous
litigation are likely to be insufficient—such as where frivolous
66. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996).
67. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION
PROCEDURE (MPEP) §§ 2173, 2173.05(a), (Sept. 2012), available at ,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2173.html.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
69. Markman, 517 U.S. at 374 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 373.
71. Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The claims, of
course, do not stand alone. Rather, they are part of ‘a fully integrated written instrument,’
consisting principally of a specification that concludes with the claims. For that reason,
claims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’ As we stated in
Vitronics, the specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”)
(citations omitted).
72. IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
74. Id. § 283.
75. Id. §§ 101–103 (requirements for patent validity).
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litigation is likely to impede competition and the potential gains far
exceed any penalty, cost, or fine imposed.
Various statutes and ethical rules attempt to deter frivolous
litigation. For example, under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, an attorney is not to file an action “unless there is a basis in
law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law.” 76 Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Rule 11”), an attorney filing an action in federal court must attest that
the action is “not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation,” and that all claims are “nonfrivolous.” 77 Litigation done for
the purpose of causing delay has been found to be an “improper
purpose” under Rule 11. 78
Rule 11 not only prohibits affirmative misconduct, e.g., filing an
action with an improper purpose, but also mandates a minimal amount
of due diligence prior to initiating litigation. 79 Thus, pursuant to Rule
11, an attorney is required “to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law
and facts before filing a pleading in a court.” 80 In the context of patent
infringement actions, the due diligence requirement of Rule 11
mandates, “at a minimum, that an attorney interpret the asserted patent
claims and compare the accused device with those claims before filing
a claim alleging infringement.” 81 Moreover, an attorney must “certify
that the claims contained therein are not frivolous, legally
unreasonable, without factual foundation, or asserted for an improper

76. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (1983). See also RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 110, 170 (2000).
77. FED R. CIV. P. 11(b). Another potential basis for awarding fees for frivolous
lawsuits may be 28 U.S.C. §1927, a fee shifting statute titled “Counsel’s Liability for
Excessive Costs.” Furthermore, fees or sanctions could be imposed under a court’s inherent
power to control litigation. E.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1991);
Autorama Corp. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d 1284, 1287–88 (10th Cir. 1986); Adams v. Carlson,
521 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1975). However, each of these grounds has substantial
limitations that make them unlikely deterrents.
78. See, e.g., Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding improper
purpose where plaintiff filed lawsuit just to delay foreclosure proceedings); Pathe Computer
Control Sys. Corp. v. Kinmont Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding timing
of motion to transfer indicated a last minute effort to delay a likely adverse decision on the
merits); INVST Fin. Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 402 (6th Cir. 1987);
Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Oximetrix, Inc., 748 F.2d
637, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
79. See Q-Pharma, Inc. v. The Andrews Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1300–01.
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purpose.” 82 However, Rule 11 is not likely to deter maintaining a
frivolous action because courts have generally not interpreted the rule
to proscribe “continuing a nonmeritorious lawsuit.” 83
Patent law also attempts to deter frivolous litigation by granting
courts the authority to award fees incurred in defending such actions.
Pursuant to Section 285 of the Patent Act (“Section 285”), a court may
award reasonable attorney’s fees in “exceptional” 84 cases, i.e., those
involving bad faith, frivolous suits, vexations litigation, or other types
of misconduct effectuated in either litigation or in securing a patent.85
Patent infringement litigation that is both objectively baseless and
made in bad faith may be deemed “exceptional” 86 and thereby subject
82. Id. at 1300. See also Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784–85 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(finding a Rule 11 violation where neither patentee nor counsel put forth reasonable prelitigation effort to assess whether there was infringement, including attempting to obtain the
alleged infringing product).
83. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 44–45 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing
cases and holding that “Rule 11’s emphasis on the need to perform a ‘reasonable inquiry’
before ‘sign[ing]’ a ‘pleading, motion, or other paper’ suggests that the rule authorizes
sanctioning an attorney only for unreasonably filing such a submission, not for failing to
withdraw or to amend the submission when postfiling contingencies reveal it to be
unfounded) (citation omitted); Julia K. Cowles, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Duty to Withdraw a Baseless Pleading, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 704–
05 (1988). Cf. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 687 F.3d 1300, 1309 n.1 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he inquiries under Rule 11 and EAJA [the Equal Access to Justice Act] look
to the situation existing at the time a particular claim or representation was made, analyzing
only the facts and law present at that time [sic] determine whether the claim or
representation was justified.”). But see G. Wayne Merchant, II, At What Point Does an
Attorney Have A Duty to Dismiss a Lawsuit That May be a Meritless Claim?, 27 J. LEGAL
PROF. 233, 235 (2003) (discussing cases wherein attorneys were sanctioned under Rule 11
because they continued with lawsuits they knew to be frivolous).
84. 35 U.S.C. § 285.
85. E.g., Highmark, 687 F.3d at 1315–16, cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 48 (Oct. 1, 2013)
(“‘Litigation misconduct generally involves unethical or unprofessional conduct by a party
or his attorneys during the course of adjudicative proceedings,’ and includes advancing
frivolous arguments during the course of the litigation or otherwise prolonging litigation in
bad faith.”) (citation omitted); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d
1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Among the types of conduct which can form a basis for
finding a case exceptional are willful infringement, inequitable conduct before the P.T.O.,
misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, and frivolous suit.”)
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court’ review of Highmark is limited to the issue of what
is the appropriate level of deference on appeal of a district court’s findings that a case is
“exceptional.” See Brief for Petitioner at i, Highmark, 134 S. Ct. 48 (Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 121163), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/No-12Highmark-Cert-PetAppendix-Final.pdf.
86. E.g., Highmark, 687 F.3d at 1308; Brooks Furniture Mfg. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc.,
393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Phonometrics, Inc. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 65
Fed Appx. 284, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The appropriateness of the Federal’s Circuit’s
standard for deciding when a case is “exceptional” is on appeal and will be decided this term
by the Supreme Court. In Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, Inc., 496 Fed.
Appx. 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 49 (Oct. 1, 2013), the Supreme Court
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to an award of fees under Section 285.
While antitrust may not be the only means of deterring frivolous
litigation, remedies for an antitrust violation—such as treble
damages—may be quite substantial and thus more likely to deter such
conduct, in contrast to violations of Rule 11 and Section 285 which
only result in fee shifting and/or sanctions. Indeed, in markets where a
monopolist may reap considerable profits by impeding competition—
such as in pharmaceuticals—antitrust may play a significant role in
preventing frivolous litigation.
III. HATCH-WAXMAN CASES INVOLVING OBJECTIVELY BASELESS
INFRINGEMENT
This section examines Hatch-Waxman litigation between a
branded drug manufacturer with an approved NDA and one or more
generic drug manufacturers that have filed an ANDA and have been
sued for patent infringement. In each of these cases, the ANDA holder
asserts that the infringement allegations are a sham and done solely to
delay generic entry. The cases demonstrate that although the reasons
why Hatch-Waxman litigation may be (or become) objectively baseless
may vary, e.g., from a lack of effort in assessing infringement, to clear
evidence of non-infringement, to evidence of bad faith and improper
motive, such litigation has the potential to be anticompetitive by
delaying generic competition.
Part A evaluates cases challenging an NDA’s patent infringement
allegations via antitrust sham litigation claims (or counterclaims),
while Part B reviews cases contesting infringement assertions under
Rule 11 and/or Section 285. Although sham litigation claims (or
counterclaims) are not uncommon in Hatch-Waxman cases, they are
often based on patents alleged to be invalid and/or unenforceable. 87 In
will review the Federal Circuit’s existing standard for determining whether conduct is
“exceptional.” While the Petitioner argues that the Federal Circuit’s standard is not
supported by the text of the statute and is contrary to its purpose, see Brief for Petitioner at
10, Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 49 (Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 121184), even if the Supreme Court agrees and applies a more flexible and easier standard for
finding a case as “exceptional,” it will have a limited deterrent effect on filing and
maintaining frivolous litigation since the statute only grants attorney’s fees for “exceptional”
cases.
87. See, e.g., In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677 (2d Cir.
2009); Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 552 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2009);
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965)
(“[T]he enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of §
2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present.”).
Similarly, litigation to enforce a patent known to be invalid may also violate the antitrust
laws. For example, in Handsguard, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., the court upheld a jury verdict
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contrast, this article focuses on cases where sham litigation is
predicated on baseless infringement assertions. 88 The article does not
purport to be an exhaustive review of all such cases, but rather,
evaluates cases considered to be illustrative of the types of situations
where maintaining baseless litigation may be anticompetitive. And
while the cases discussed assert that the action was a sham at the time
the case was filed, as discussed infra Part IVA, this is a distinction
without a difference. That is, there are similar anticompetitive
concerns with maintaining baseless litigation as with filing such
litigation, and no reason to treat such actions differently.
A. Antitrust Sham Litigation Cases Predicated on Baseless
Infringement
The following are three Hatch-Waxman cases where antitrust
claims (or counterclaims) were based on allegations that the underlying
infringement actions were baseless. While the cases arise in different
factual and procedural contexts, in each case the court agreed that the
allegations or facts asserted plausibly supported a finding that the NDA
holder’s infringement litigation was a sham.
Sham litigation claims (or counterclaims) made in the HatchWaxman context must satisfy the same elements as all sham litigation
claims. Thus, while Hatch-Waxman litigation certainly has its unique
features, to succeed on a claim of antitrust sham litigation requires
both: (a) demonstrating that the litigation is a sham and thereby not
granted antitrust immunity under Noerr-Pennington; and (b) proving a
substantive antitrust violation.
Recall that the filing of litigation to vindicate legal rights is
typically afforded antitrust immunity. However, sham litigation that is
both objectively baseless “in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits,” and is subjectively
improper, i.e., “conceals ‘an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor,’” 89 is not granted immunity.
And while proving that litigation is a sham is often a formidable task, it
certainly is not impossible. Indeed, it is worth emphasizing that courts
have largely rejected efforts to immunize Hatch-Waxman litigation

imposing antitrust liability for initiation and maintenance of an infringement action despite
knowing that the patent was invalid. 743 F.2d 1282 at 1300 (9th Cir. 1984).
88. In a few of the cases discussed, sham litigation claims were predicated on both
unenforceability of the patent as well as baseless infringement. See, e.g., Nabi
Biopharmaceuticals v. Roxane Labs, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-889, 2007 WL 894473 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 21, 2007).
89. Prof’l Real Estate Invs. v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993).
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from antitrust liability due to certain features of its regulatory context.
Thus, while a few courts have suggested that the filing of HatchWaxman litigation should be presumptively reasonable (and thus not a
sham) due to the limited forty-five day period provided to branded drug
manufactures to file suit in order to stay FDA approval of the generic
for thirty months, these decisions have largely not been followed. 90
1. PhosLo
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals v. Roxane Labs 91 was a suit involving
PhosLo, a branded drug marketed by Nabi and approved by FDA to
treat hyperphosphatemia, a condition causing the body to retain high
levels of phosphate. 92 Nabi listed three patents for PhosLo in the
Orange Book, including 6,576,665 (‘665) which claimed a calcium
acetate capsule with a bulk density of between 0.50 kg/L and 0.80 kg/
90. For example, In AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Labs, Inc., Nos. 00 Civ. 6749, 03 Civ.
6057, 2010 WL 2079722 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010), a Hatch-Waxman case involving
omeprazole, the court suggested that patent litigation by a branded company would likely
always be objectively reasonable and thereby not a sham:
[A]t the outset of Astra’s case, Mylan gave Astra an objectively reasonable basis
to sue: Mylan provided Astra notice of its Paragraph IV certification. This is an
act of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). The Court agrees with Astra
that a reasonable plaintiff in a Hatch-Waxman case would be expected to know
few details about the accused product at the outset of litigation and plaintiff’s
counsel may reasonably rely on discovery to learn the material details.
Id. at *4 (citation omitted). However, as discussed infra, another judge in the same court
came out with a very different conclusion in similar omeprazole patent litigation against a
different generic manufacturer. AstraZeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs, Ltd., No. 07 Civ.
6790(CM), 2010 WL 1375176 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010). Similarly, in Celegene Corp. v.
KV Pharms. Co., No. 07–4819 (SDW), 2008 WL 2856469 (D.N.J. July 22, 2008), a HatchWaxman litigation involving methylphenidate (an ADHD drug), the court suggested that
filing infringement might always be objectively reasonably:
Because the Act has made the act of submitting an ANDA itself an act of
infringement, in a Hatch–Waxman ANDA case, the attorney can conduct a
reasonable and competent inquiry into the act of infringement by investigating
whether a relevant ANDA has been filed. In the instant case, the Notice Letter
provided sufficient basis for an attorney to reasonably believe that a relevant
ANDA had been filed, and thus that an actionable act of infringement had
occurred. Because submitting the ANDA itself is an act of infringement, and is
therefore actionable, and because Celgene’s Complaint predicates both of its
two counts on that act of infringement, Celgene and its attorneys had no prefiling obligation to investigate whether KV’s methylphenidate drug actually
infringed Celgene’s patents. Because there is no dispute that KV submitted an
ANDA which constitutes an act of infringement, and because KV states that,
prior to filing suit, Celgene had received the Notice Letter which gave notice of
the ANDA submission, this Court concludes that Celgene’s prefiling
infringement investigation was reasonable under the circumstances.
Id. at *3. These cases, however, have largely not been followed.
91. 2007 WL 894473.
92. Id. at *7.
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L. 93 After Roxane filed an ANDA for generic PhosLo and submitted a
paragraph IV certification on the ‘665 patent, Nabi sued Roxane for
patent infringement. 94
In response to the infringement suit, Roxane filed a
monopolization counterclaim alleging antitrust sham litigation
predicated on baseless infringement claims as well as an unenforceable
According to Roxane, Nabi’s conduct in filing and
patent. 95
“contin[uing] to maintain the current action” was objectively baseless
because, prior to the litigation, Roxane provided Nabi with “clear
evidence” that its generic did not infringe Nabi’s patents. 96
Specifically, Roxane contended that prior to the litigation, it provided
samples of its generic to Nabi that unequivocally demonstrated nonMoreover, as evidence of bad faith, Roxane
infringement. 97
highlighted Nabi’s refusal to provide Roxane with the results of any of
its analysis of Roxane’s samples. 98 And while Nabi filed a motion to
dismiss Roxane’s monopolization counterclaim, the court denied the
motion, concluding that Roxane’s allegations, if true, were sufficient to
support an antitrust claim. 99
2. Neurontin
In re Neurontin Antitrust Litigation 100 concerned gabapentin, an
anti-epilepsy drug marketed by Warner-Lambert as Neurontin. 101
Warner-Lambert claimed patents on the drug as well as on various uses
and processes involving the drug. 102 Several generic manufacturers
93. Id. at *1.
94. Id. at *3.
95. Id. at *1–2. The court also held that Nabi made sufficient factual assertions to
supports its claims that the patent was unenforceable due to fraud on the patent office and
that enforcement of such patent could state an antitrust claim. Id. at *4–5.
96. Id. at *1, *3.
97. Id. at *3. According to Roxane, the information it provided to Nabi prior to
litigation “demonstrated that Roxane’s proposed calcium acetate capsules are made from
calcium acetate with a bulk density outside of the range claimed in the 665 patent and
utilizing untabletted powder within a capsule, not compressed into a caplet as required by
the claims of the 665 patent.” Id.
98. Id. at *4.
99. Id. at *4 (“[B]ecause [the] counterclaims allege that the lawsuit filed . . . is
objectively baseless and conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor, the counterclaims adequately state a claim and should not be
dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”).
100. Nos. 02-1830 (FSH), 02-2731 (FSH), 02-5583 (FSH), 2009 WL 2751029 (D.N.J.
Auguest 28, 2009).
101. Id. at *2. Although the drug has been approved by the FDA for epilepsy since
1993, its primary use was off-label for various neurodegenerative conditions, such as
Parkinsons, ALS. Id.
102. Id. at *1. For example, patent 4,894,476 (‘476) claimed gabapentin monohydrate;
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filed ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications, and Warner-Lambert
promptly commenced patent litigation against all of them. 103 In 2003,
after several years of litigation, summary judgment of noninfringement was granted on the most relevant patents. 104
Not long after the summary judgment decision, antitrust litigation
was commenced by direct purchasers of Neurontin. 105 The direct
purchasers alleged, inter alia, that Warner-Lambert’s patent litigation
was a sham and part of an “overall scheme to monopolize the market
for gabapentin anhydrous products by forestalling, if not completely
preventing, generic competition.” 106 In particular, several of the
infringement actions were challenged as being objectively baseless and
made in bad faith. 107
Warner-Lambert filed a motion to dismiss, contending that its
infringement actions were immune under Noerr-Pennington, 108 and
that plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to support a
The court disagreed and denied the
monopolization claim. 109
motion. 110 First, the court rejected Warner-Lambert’s immunity
argument, noting that sham litigation is a well-recognized exception to
Noerr-Pennington immunity. 111 Second, the court held that the
patent 5,084, 479 (‘479) claimed the use of gabapentin anhydrous to treat neurodegenerative
diseases, and 6,054,482 (‘482) claimed a process for developing low-lactum gabapentin. Id.
103. Id. at *2.
104. Id. at *3. For one of the patents, Warner-Lambert did not even oppose summary
judgment, effectively conceding non-infringement. Id. at *6 n.20.
105. See id. *3.
106. Id. at *4. The overall scheme included:
(1) procuring two additional patents that it improperly listed in the Orange Book;
(2) manipulating the patent approval process so that a third patent with claims so
limited that they are impossible to accurately measure or distinguish from the prior
art so that the patent could be used to delay generic entry; (3) filing and
prosecuting multiple sham lawsuits on these patents that no reasonable litigant
could have expected to succeed; and (4) engaging in fraudulent off-label
promotion to convince doctors to prescribe Neurontin for uses for which it was not
approved.
Id.
107. Id. at *6. Specifically, it was alleged that: (i) the ‘476 patent litigation was baseless
because the generics sought approval for a gabapentin anhydrous formulation rather than the
patented gabapentin monohydrate formulation; (ii) the lawsuits on the ‘479 patent were
baseless because the generics were not seeking approval for the use claimed by that patent (a
use which was not approved by FDA); and (iii) the ‘482 patent litigation was baseless
because the patent’s claims “are formulated so narrowly, it is not possible to determine
whether generic products would actually infringe the patent.” Id. at. Accord In re
Gabapentin Patent Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 340, 361–64 (D.N.J. 2009) (discussing plaintiff’s
allegation of baseless patent litigation based on Gabapentin drug).
108. See supra Part II.A.
109. Neurontin, 2009 WL 2751029, at *21–22.
110. Id. at *23.
111. Id. at *21 (“Warner-Lambert correctly argues that litigation to enforce its rights
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plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to support their antitrust claims. 112
3. Wellbutrin XL
Most recently, the court in In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust
Litigation 113 addressed antitrust sham litigation in a summary judgment
context. Wellbutrin XL involved Hatch-Waxman litigation for a
controlled release formulation for the antidepressant bupropion
hydrochloride, which is marketed by Biovail as Wellbutrin XL. 114
Biovail listed two patents for the controlled release formula: 6,096,341
(‘341) and 6,143, 327 (‘327). 115 Four generic manufacturers filed
ANDAs for the drug with paragraph IV certifications, and Biovail
promptly filed infringement actions against each.116 All four patent
lawsuits settled. 117 Thereafter, direct and indirect purchasers of
Wellbutrin XL filed antitrust litigation against Biovail, alleging
numerous anticompetitive acts including sham litigation. 118 Biovail
moved for summary judgment on various grounds, arguing inter alia
that its infringement action against one of the generics—Abrika—was
per se reasonable (and hence not a sham) because Abrika refused to
under its gabapentin patents is presumptively immune from antitrust scrutiny under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. However, Warner-Lambert is not entitled to such immunity if
Plaintiffs can establish that the ‘476, ‘479, and ‘482 infringement actions were ‘sham
litigation.’ ” ).
112. Id. Specifically, Plaintiffs averred that Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded
the fact that the ‘476 patent was not infringed by the generic’s drug, and yet still initiated
infringement actions. Id. With respect to the ‘479 patent actions, Plaintiffs claimed that
Warner-Lambert brought suit against the generic manufacturers without evidence of
knowledge and intent to induce infringement, while knowing that none of the generic
applicants sought approval to market generic gabapentin to treat neurodegenerative diseases.
Id. Finally, Plaintiffs argued that they have sufficiently alleged that “no reasonable litigant
would believe that the [‘482 patent’s claims] could ultimately be upheld as valid, definite,
and/or infringed, [b]ecause of the inability to measure chloride ions from a mineral acid at
the low levels specified by the ‘482 patent, or to distinguish the level of chloride ions from a
mineral acid in the claim from the prior art.” Id. at *21 (internal quotations marks omitted).
113. In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., Nos. 08–2431 (direct), 08–2433 (indirect),
2012 WL 1657734 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012).
114. Id. at *1–2. Prior formulations of Wellbutrin included a rapid release formulation
that was to be taken three times a day, Wellbutrin IR, and a sustained release formulation,
Wellbutrin SR. Id. The later was brought to market in 1997 and was also the subject of
antitrust litigation. See, e.g., In re Wellbutrin SR Antitrust Litig., No. Civ.A. 04–5525,
Civ.A. 04–5898, Civ.A. 05–396, 2006 WL 616292 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2006).
115. Wellbutrin, 2012 WL 1657734 at *3.
116. Impax, Waston, Anchen, and Abrika were the four generics that filed ANDAs.
Although the ‘327 patent was listed in the Orange book and was claimed to be infringed in
some of the ANDA litigation, the infringement claims on the ‘327 were eventually dropped
in all suits. Id. at *5 n.8. Only the ‘341 patent was at issue in the antitrust cases. Id. at *5
117. Id. at *6.
118. Id. at *1. The suit also was brought against GlaxoSmithKlein, which was the
distributor of Wellbutrin XL. Id.
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supply it with samples, and thus Biovail was unable to do a proper
infringement analysis prior to filing suit.119
The court rejected Biovail’s argument that its conduct should be
per se reasonable. 120 Rather, according to the court, while inability to
obtain a sample may excuse a patentee from conducting a proper
infringement analysis prior to filing suit, the litigation could still be a
sham if Biovail’s interpretation of its patent claims was
unreasonable. 121 Thus, the Court not only rejected immunity for filing
the lawsuit, but did so even when a pre-litigation infringement analysis
was not possible due to the generic’s conduct. Nevertheless, the Court
did grant summary judgment for patentees in all four infringement
actions—including the Abrika action 122—after concluding that the facts
did not support the plaintiffs’ theory. 123
These cases demonstrate that courts recognize antitrust claims for
filing sham litigation in the Hatch-Waxman regulatory context.
Moreover, although the cases focused on the filing of the suit, it is
evident from the decisions that maintaining the litigation may be
considered in evaluating anticompetitive effects.
B. Frivolous and/or “Bad Faith” Cases Predicated on Baseless
Infringement
The cases discussed in this part involve requests for fees in
defending frivolous or “bad faith” litigation, brought pursuant to Rule
119. Id. at *13.
120. Id. at *17.
121. Id. at *13 (“The defendants argue as a preliminary matter that in the HatchWaxman context, they had a reasonable basis to institute suit against Abrika because Abrika
did not provide pre-filing access to its ANDA. . . This argument only holds weight,
however, if this Court agrees that the defendants could reasonably expect success on the
merits of their claim construction argument . . . .’”) (citations omitted).
122. Id. at *17. In the Abrika action the court granted summary judgment for Biovail
because it concluded that the litigation—even if it were a sham—did not delay Abrika from
launching its generic and thus did not cause anticompetitive harm. Id. Specifically, the
thirty month stay caused by the allegedly baseless litigation expired over a year before
Abrika obtained FDA approval for its generic. Consequently, the court concluded that the
litigation was not the cause of Abrika’s delay and thus, Abrika could not have sustained
competitive harm due to the litigation. Id.
123. Id. Specifically, for three of the infringement actions, the issue was primarily
whether Biovail’s interpretation of claims in the ‘341 patent were objectively baseless.
Although it found that Biovail’s interpretations were questionable, the court concluded that
they were not objectively baseless and thereby not a sham. Id. at *8–9, *11, *19. On the
fourth infringement action, the court did not directly address whether the litigation was a
sham, but rather granted summary judgment on grounds that even if it were, there was
insufficient evidence of anticompetitive harm. Id. at *17. While the court believed that
patentees had a “colorable legal argument” in support of its infringement claims (and thus
was not baseless), it declined to make a finding on that issue. Id. at *15, *17.
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11 and/or Section 285. Because Rule 11 and Section 285 cases may
also be based upon objectively baseless infringement claims—and thus
may potentially support antitrust claims as well—they are worth
examining.
1. Prilosec OTC
AstraZeneca v. Dr. Reddy’s 124 concerned an over-the-counter
version of the popular heartburn drug omeprazole magnesium,
marketed by AstraZeneca as Prilosec OTC. AstraZeneca listed two
patents in the Orange Book for the drug, which claimed a particular
crystalline formulation of omeprazole magnesium and the process used
in manufacturing it. 125 Dr. Reddy’s (among others) submitted an
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification asserting, inter alia, that its
ANDA did not infringe the patents listed for Prilosec OTC. 126 After
two years of discovery, during which Dr. Reddy’s provided samples of
its generic and access to its Drug Master File, as well as responses to
AstraZeneca’s deposition and interrogatory requests, the court granted
summary judgment of non-infringement. 127
Thereafter, the court granted Dr. Reddy’s motion for fees under
Section 285, citing various grounds evidencing that the case was
frivolous and “nothing more than an effort to keep a legitimate
competitor out of the market on flimsy-to-nonexistent grounds.” 128
First, the Court found AstraZeneca’s interpretation of its claims wholly
unreasonable. 129 Specifically, the court concluded that despite the
patent being “easy to understand,” the patentee put forth a “tortured
claim construction,” arguing for an interpretation of its claims that was
“inherently self-contradictory” and which “made “absolutely no
sense.” 130 Second, the court believed that non-infringement could
easily be determined via a straight-forward comparison of the branded
product (and process) with the generic product (and process).131 Third,
124. AstraZeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs, Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 6790 (CM), 2010 WL
1375176 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010).
125. See id. at *2–3.
126. See id. at *2.
127. Id. at *2–3.
128. Id. at *5, *6, *9. The court also suggested that the action may violate Rule 11. Id.
at *6.
129. AstraZeneca, 2010 WL 1375176 at *8.
130. Id. at *8.
131. Id. at *1. (“That the process used by defendants to create omeprazole magnesium
did not read on plaintiffs’ patent was apparent from a reading of the patent and a description
of defendants’ process for creating the popular drug Prilosec OTC. Indeed, defendants’
products and process are in key respects exactly the opposite of what plaintiffs claim in their
patents.”) The court also found that non-infringement of the formulation patents was simple
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according to the court, notwithstanding substantial evidence of noninfringement (both pre-litigation and early on in the suit) and an offer
by Dr. Reddy’s of a “reasonable way to resolve [the] lawsuit
expeditiously,” AstraZeneca continued to litigate and sought “wideranging discovery.” 132 Fourth, the court found that up to and including
summary judgment, AstraZeneca “never put forward any evidence of
infringement and any reasonably party would have known that [the]
action should have been terminated early.” 133 Finally, the court
determined that the suit was brought and maintained solely for an
improper purpose, i.e., to deter generic competition. 134
2. Amrix
In re Cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride Extended Release Capsule
Patent Litigation, 135 involved cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride capsules,
a skeletal muscle relaxant. The drug is marketed as Amrix, and rights
to the drug are shared by several companies (“patentees”). 136 Two
patents were listed in the Orange Book for Amrix: 7,387,793 (‘793)
(claiming an extended release dosage form of skeletal muscle
relaxants), and 7,544,372 (‘372) (claiming a method of relieving
muscle spasms with the extended release formulation).137 Various
generic manufacturers submitted ANDAs for the drug, including
Upon receiving paragraph IV certifications, patent
Anchen. 138
litigation was initiated against each company. 139 In granting summary
judgment of non-infringement for Anchen, the court emphasized that
not only did patentees fail to provide any evidence as to Anchen’s
infringement, but even admitted that the ANDA did not infringe the

to ascertain because there was “no evidence whatever that DRL makes or uses a salt with
the requisite degree of crystallinity” and that AstraZeneca’s experts did not “suggest any
reason why the process and apparatus used by DRL would result in a finished product
containing 70%-or-more crystalline omeprazole magnesium.” Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at *1, *6.
133. AstraZeneca, 2010 WL 1375176 at *4. See also Id. at *6 (“All the discovery in the
world would not give Astra a stronger argument against dismissal .....” (Slip op. at 31 n. 5.)
But of course, “all the discovery in the world” is what Astra wanted-and it wanted that
discovery in order to keep defendants' product off the market for as long as possible.”).
134. Id. at *1 (“It was obvious from very early on that plaintiffs had brought and were
maintaining this lawsuit in a desperate effort to keep any competing product from hitting the
shelves-even if the competing product was not an infringing product.”).
135. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 794
F. Supp. 2d 517 (D. Del. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 676 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
136. Id. at 523.
137. See id. at 524–25.
138. See id. at 522.
139. Id. at 523.
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patents. 140
Shortly after being granted summary judgment, Anchen filed a
Section 285 motion for attorney’s fees, arguing that the infringement
action was baseless and initiated solely to deter generic competition by
“improperly invoke[ing] an FDA stay of approval of Anchen’s
ANDA.” 141 While the court disagreed that the evidence demonstrated
that the litigation was frivolous at the time filed, it agreed that it
became frivolous at a later time. 142 In particular, the court found
significant that patentees failed to provide any evidence of
infringement and even conceded that Anchen’s ANDA did not
infringe. 143 The court concluded that the case was “exceptional” and
granted fees, holding that there was sufficient evidence that “the suit
became unjustifiable once plaintiff’s declined to acknowledge that
there was no need to maintain the suit.” 144
As with the cases discussed in the prior section, these cases
evidence situations where baseless litigation was brought and
maintained to delay competition. And while antitrust claims were not
made in these cases, they potentially could have been. Finally, it is
worth emphasizing that the Amrix decision made clear that even if a
suit was not baseless at the time filed, if it becomes so at a later time, a
party has a duty to dismiss the suit or else face potential liability for
failing to do so.
IV. ANALYSIS
As evidenced by the cases discussed, filing and maintaining
baseless lawsuits may have anticompetitive effects. And while the
cases focused primarily on initiation of litigation, it was recognized
that maintaining the actions was also improper. Indeed, where
maintaining baseless litigation has anticompetitive effects, there is no
compelling rationale for creating a legal distinction between the filing

140. Id. at 523 n.3. In contrast, the court concluded that several of the other generic’s
formulations did infringe the listed patents. See id.
141. In re Cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., Civ.
No. 09–MD–2118–SLR, 2012 WL 95592, at *1–2 (D. Del. Jan 12, 2012).
142. Id. at *3 n.8. In concluding that filing suit was not a sham, the court appeared to
find significant that Anchen refused to provide ANDA samples prior to litigation due to
purported confidentiality concerns and an inability to come to terms on a confidentiality
agreement. See id. at *2. The court thus seemed sympathetic to patentees assertion that that
they had no choice but to sue. See id.
143. Id. at *2 n.4.
144. Id. at *3 n.8. Although patentees attempted to justify maintaining the suit to
“police” against possible ANDA reformulations by Anchen, the court rejected this
argument, concluding that there were existing safeguards for such concerns. Id. at *1–3.
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and maintaining of a baseless action. 145 And in situations where a
litigant is able to offer a questionable but potentially legitimate basis
for filing an action (thereby making the suit unlikely to qualify as a
sham), the greater need for imposing liability for continuing to litigate
after it becomes clear that the action is meritless. Consequently, this
section provides the argument for antitrust liability for maintaining
baseless litigation.
A. Antitrust Sham Litigation for Maintaining Baseless Litigation is
Good Policy
There are several justifications for imposing antitrust liability for
continuing to litigate a baseless action for anticompetitive purposes.
And where such litigation may cause anticompetitive effects—such as
in Hatch-Waxman litigation—the potential for incurring antitrust
liability may be an important deterrent.
First, antitrust liability is needed because laws prohibiting
frivolous and bad faith litigation (such as Section 285 or Rule 11), are
inadequate deterrents in many situations. Granting fees under Section
285 is largely within a court’s discretion, and thus a court may decline
to impose fees in even egregious circumstances. 146 Similarly, Rule 11
is not only discretional, but several courts have interpreted it as only
governing the filing of litigation and thereby rejected its application to
conduct done in the course of litigation (including continuing to

145. The best argument for imposing such a distinction would be if the filing of the
action has a particular anticompetitive effect, separate and apart from maintaining the action.
In the Hatch-Waxman content, this may be the case, as the filing of an infringement action
upon receiving a paragraph IV certification triggers a thirty-month stay of FDA approval for
the generic. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Moreover, the effect of dismissing the action on
the thirty-month stay is not clear—which obviously impacts any anticompetitive effect of
both filing and maintaining the litigation. Compare In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“A dismissal of the Hatch-Waxman
infringement lawsuit lifts the 30 month stay.”), with Endo Pharms. v. Mylan Techs., No. 11–
220–GMS, 2013 WL 936452, at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 11, 2013) (concluding in dicta that
dismissal of Hatch-Waxman litigation will not extinguish the 30 month stay, since “[i]f
Congress had wished the thirty month stay to be extinguished upon a dismissal without
prejudice, it would have said as much.”). In 1999, the FDA proposed a rule that included
extinguishing the 30 month stay upon dismissal of the patent litigation, but the proposal was
withdrawn. See 180-Day Generic Exclusivity for Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 64
Fed. Reg. 42873, 42886 (proposed Aug. 6, 1999) (withdrawn in 67 Fed. Reg. 66593 (Nov.
1, 2002)).
146. See, e.g., Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2012), where the Federal Circuit reversed a District Court’s denial of fees under Rule 11 and
Section 285, finding that patentees’ claims construction was clearly frivolous and
unreasonable and neither supported by any part of the patent (e.g. claims, specification,
preferred embodiment) nor the prosecutorial history. See infra Part IV.B,
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maintain a baseless action). 147 Moreover, the remedies available under
these provisions—mostly payment of defendant’s fees and costs—are
not particularly onerous and thus not likely to discourage frivolous
litigation. As monopoly profits may be quite large, a firm may well be
quite content risking having to pay fees and even sanctions (in contrast
to the risk of treble damages for antitrust violations).
Second, to the extent that continuing to litigate a baseless action is
anticompetitive, there is no rational basis for only imposing liability on
the filing of the action but not on maintaining it. And where the
litigation circumvents legislative policies, such as those created by the
Hatch-Waxman Act, it should be prevented to the fullest extent
possible. Thus, imposing liability on both filing and maintaining
baseless, anticompetitive litigation would likely have the favorable
effect of further deterring such deleterious conduct.
Third, successfully proving an antitrust claim is a difficult task,
requiring not only demonstrating anticompetitive effects in most cases,
but also various procedural hurdles. Consequently, concerns that
imposing antitrust liability for maintaining baseless litigation could
“open the floodgates” to additional antitrust litigation is
unwarranted. 148 Indeed, outside of the context of the Hatch-Waxman
Act (or a similar type of regulatory scheme), proving anticompetitive
effects of sham litigation may well be difficult.
B. Evaluating Cases for Potential Antitrust Liability
While antitrust liability should be imposed against companies
which maintain anticompetitive, frivolous lawsuits, determining
whether a particular action is baseless and anticompetitive may be quite
difficult. Indeed, there may be significant legal and practical
difficulties in establishing a prima facie antitrust claim, much less
proving it. Nevertheless, by focusing on Hatch-Waxman cases, this
section suggests several potential criteria that may assist in identifying
appropriate cases.
The first criterion evaluated is the litigant’s efforts (or lack
thereof) in ascertaining infringement prior to filing suit. If a patentee
147. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs. Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988);
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987); Pantry Queen Foods v. Lifschultz
Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265,
1274 (2d Cir. 1986).
148. It is possible that antitrust liability for maintaining baseless litigation might result in
additional antitrust litigation to the extent that it addresses statute of limitations problems.
That is, in cases where the filing of a lawsuit is the sole alleged anticompetitive act and is
outside the limitations period, the act of maintaining the action might save the claim from
dismissal (assuming at least some of the litigation is within the limitations period).
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failed to take reasonable steps to evaluate infringement prior to
litigation, this may be indicative that the action was filed (and
maintained) for an improper purpose. For example, the court in In re
Neurontin Antitrust Litigation denied a motion to dismiss the antitrust
claim in part due to allegations that the patentee never tested or
examined the allegedly infringing product prior to filing suit.149
Second is examining whether a patentee continuously insists upon
an interpretation of its patent claims that is nonsensical, wholly
unsupported, or contradicted by either the patent’s specification or its
own assertions made before the P.T.O. For example, Raylon v.
Complus Data 150 involved Raylon’s patent for a hand-held ticketing
device that contained its own internal keypad and printer and included
a display that was “pivotally mounted on” the device. 151 The patent
149. In re Neurontin Antitrust Litig., Nos. 02-1830 (FSH), 02-2731(FSH), 025583(FSH), 2009 WL 2751029, at *23 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2009). Cf. Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar
Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding Rule 11 sanction where the patentee
“failed to perform a pre-suit investigation.”); Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784–85
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rule 11 sanctions against patentee based in part on fact that patentee never
attempted to obtain a copy of the alleged infringing product); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v.
Genpharm, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 367, 380 (D. N.J. 1999) (“The resolution of the question
whether plaintiffs’ suit is objectively baseless as to Genpharm involves the determination of
whether plaintiffs undertook a reasonable investigation before filing suit, whether plaintiffs
knew or should have known that Genpharm had not infringed the Syntex process patents,
and whether a reasonable litigant could have realistically expected success on the merits at
the time the suit was filed.”).
150. Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, 700 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
151. Id. at 1364–65 (“Claim 1 [of US patent No. 6,655,589] is representative of the
patented system:
1. A system for investigating an identification of a person and for issuing tickets,
the identification comprising a card having a computer readable magnetic tape
secured on the card, the computer readable magnetic tape containing pertinent data
relating to the person displayed on the identification card, said system being
connectable to a computer for transmitting data between said system and the
computer, said system being connectable to a data cable of a computer, said
system comprising:
a housing having an interior, said housing having an elongated slot for selectively
receiving the identification card, said housing having an elongated aperture
providing access into said interior of said housing;
an input assembly for inputting data about a person, said input assembly being
mounted on said housing, said input assembly including a data reading means for
reading the computer readable magnetic tape on the identification card;
a transceiver assembly for remotely communicating with a computer, said
transceiver assembly being mounted in said interior of said housing;
a display for displaying data entered into said input assembly, said display being
pivotally mounted on said housing;
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included a drawing that illustrated the invention’s preferred
embodiment, which was comprised of (among other things) a
rectangular body with buttons for entering data, a location where
tickets could be printed out, and a separate display attached to the
device. 152 Raylon filed patent infringement actions against various
software and hardware manufacturers of hand-held ticketing devices. 153
In defending the lawsuits, several defendants countered that their
products could not infringe on Raylon’s patent because their devices
had rigid, fixed-mounted displays that could not be pivoted. 154 Raylon
did not contest that defendants’ products contained fixed-mounted,
non-pivoting displays, but nonetheless maintained that defendants’
devices infringed its patents because those devices could be manually
pivoted, i.e., by the person holding the device. 155
The District Court rejected Raylon’s arguments as one which
“stretch[es] the bounds of reasonableness,” because it was unsupported
by the evidence and would essentially ignore the “pivotally mounted”
limitation of the patent. 156 Nevertheless, the District Court denied
defendant’s motion for sanctions and fees under Rule 11 and Section
285. 157 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Raylon’s
interpretation of “pivotally mounted” was “frivolous” and
“unreasonable” because the patent’s claims, specifications, and
preferred embodiment all clearly “show[] a display that is mounted to
pivot relative to the housing on which it is attached.” 158 Moreover, the

a printer assembly being mounted in said interior of said housing for printing a
ticket; and wherein said printer assembly includes
a substrate for receiving indicia, said substrate including an end extendable
through said elongated aperture in said housing,
a printer means for printing indicia on said substrate, and means for advancing
said substrate with respect to said printer means such that substrate is advanced
though said elongated aperture in said housing when said printer means prints
indicia on said substrate. Independent system claims 16 and 17 also recite a
display being pivotally mounted on said housing limitation.”) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
152. See id. at 1363–64.
153. See id. at 1363.
154. See id. at 1366.
155. Id. at 1365 (“In other words, under Raylon’s theory of infringement a display with
a fixed-mounted screen meets the ‘pivotally mounted on said housing’ limitation when the
user pivots the device by moving his elbow, wrist, or other joint.”).
156. Id. at 1365–66.
157. Id. at 1366.
158. Id. at 1367–69 (“Applying the objectively reasonable standard, we agree with
defendants that Raylon’s claim construction (and thus infringement contentions) were
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Federal Circuit concluded that Raylon’s construction was unsupported
by the patent prosecution history (made before the P.T.O) and “does
not conform to the standard canons of claims construction.” 159
Third is examining whether a patentee inexorably asserts
infringement, even after discovery and evaluation of the accused
product(s) or method(s) substantiate non-infringement. For example,
in AstraZeneca v. Dr. Reddy’s, the court was critical of AstraZeneca’s
continued position that Dr. Reddy’s generic product infringed its
formulation patent despite substantial evidence that Dr. Reddy’s
formulation was not 70% crystalline, as required by the asserted
patent. 160 Similarly, the court in In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride
Extended Release Capsule Patent Litigation granted fees under Section
285 in part because patentee maintained its lawsuit despite failing to
frivolous. . . . Raylon’s claim construction of ‘display pivotally mounted on said housing’ is
a prime example of a construction that falls below this threshold. Raylon, throughout the
litigation, argued that this term should be construed as requiring a ‘display being capable of
being moved or pivoted relative to the viewer’s perspective.’ Its construction encompasses
any portable device with a display, regardless of how it is mounted to the housing . . . .
[Moreover], [t]hroughout the specification, the patentee describes the invention as
containing a display that ‘is pivotally mounted on the housing.’ A display pivotally mounted
on the housing is even identified by the patentee as one of the important features of the
invention. Figure 1, the only schematic of the preferred embodiment, shows a display that is
mounted to pivot relative to the housing on which it is attached.”) (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 1369. Accord Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause the written description clearly refutes Eon-Net’s claim construction,
the district court did not clearly err in finding the Eon-Net pursued objectively baseless
infringement claims.”); Phonometrics v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 02-1360, 2003 WL
2008126, at *1 (Fed. Cir. April 29, 2003) (“[I]t was clear after we issued the claim
construction in Northern Telecom that Choice Hotels did not infringe U.S. Patent No.
3,769,463 (“the ‘463 patent”). The district court thus concluded that [b]ecause Plaintiff
continued to litigate this case knowing that its claim could not meet the standard for
infringement of the ‘463 patent articulated by the Federal Circuit, this case is exceptional. . .
.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. AstraZeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 6790(CM), 2010 WL
1375176, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010). Accord Nabi Biopharmaceuticals v. Roxane Labs.,
No. 2:05-CV-889, 2007 WL 894473, *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2007) (refusing to dismiss a
sham litigation claim against Nabi where the court found that Roxane provided samples and
documents that “demonstrated that Roxane’s proposed calcium acetate capsules are made
from calcium acetate with a bulk density outside of the range claimed in the 665 patent and
utilizing untabletted powder within a capsule, not compressed into a caplet as required by
the claims of the 665 patent.”). In contrast, where a patentee voluntarily dismisses an
infringement action after discovery indicated non-infringement, a court is less likely to find
that the litigation was a sham. See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Health Plan v. Abbott Labs., Inc.,
552 F.3d 1033, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is true that Abbott was litigious, but to some degree
its litigiousness was a product of Hatch-Waxman. Abbott filed suit quickly in order to
preserve its rights under Hatch-Waxman, but it did not persist in litigating when it became
obvious that the suits were baseless.”); Q-Pharma, Inc. v. The Andrews Jergen Co., 360 F.3d
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc., 213 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
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provide any evidence of infringement as to certain claims—even as late
as trial. 161
Fourth, litigation misconduct may evince that the action was
initiated and maintained for an improper purpose. For example, in
AstraZeneca v. Dr. Reddy’s, one factor in the court’s awarding of fees
was patentee’s discovery abuses, i.e., its “wide-ranging” discovery
requests which were a mere “fishing-expedition” done for the purpose
of deterring competition. 162 Similarly, engaging in a pattern of dubious
litigation may suggest an improper purpose, particularly when the
allegations made in the various actionsappear weak and/or
unreasonable. 163
Finally, evaluating anticompetitive effects of litigation is also an
important consideration in identifying suitable antitrust cases. In the
Hatch-Waxman context, filing and maintaining baseless litigation is
likely to impede competition in cases where it delays generic entry. In
other contexts, it may be far more difficult to demonstrate that sham
litigation, either by itself or along with other conduct, is
anticompetitive.
Applying these criteria will assist in identifying appropriate cases
for potential antitrust liability. And while the criteria discussed focuses
161. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig.,
2012 WL 95592, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 12, 2012). Accord AstraZeneca, 2010 WL 1375176, at
*4 (“Astra never put forth any evidence of infringement and any reasonable party would
have known that this action should have been terminated early.”).
162. AstraZeneca, 2010 WL 1375176 at *6 (‘ “ [A]ll the discovery in the world’ is what
Astra wanted-and it wanted that discovery in order to keep defendants’ product off the
market for as long as possible.’ One of the ways in which Astra needlessly prolonged this
litigation, and increased the cost of defending it, was to insist on wide-ranging discoveryeven going so far as to tell the court that Hatch-Waxman litigation was supposed to require
lots of discovery. A determination that Astra maintained this action in bad faith is supported
by my findings that, ‘Astra was a party in search of a theory on which to proceed,’ that
Astra ‘obviously wanted unlimited discovery,’ and that Astra’s discovery requests ‘smack of
a fishing expedition.’”) (citations and ellipsis omitted). Accord Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar
Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (various litigation conduct found, including
not engaging in claim construction process in “good faith,” evasive conduct, and an overall
“lack of regard for the judicial system” as evidenced by depositions and interrogatory
responses.).
163. Beckman Instruments v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he district court’s finding of exceptional circumstances is based on a strategy of
vexatious activity.”); Eon-Net, 653 F.3d at 1324, 1327 (patentee’s “numerous instances of
litigation misconduct,” which included filing dozens of baseless suits “to extract a nuisance
value settlement” all supported an award of fees under Section 285). Cf. Cal. Motor Transp.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (“[A] pattern of baseless, repetitive claims
may emerge which leads the fact finder to conclude that the administrative and judicial
processes have been abused”); Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92,
101 (2d Cir. 2000); USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa County Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 31 F.3d 800, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1994).
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on patent litigation in the Hatch-Waxman context, several may be
applied in other contexts. For example, a lack of due diligence in
evaluating the strength of one’s claim prior to filing suit may be
indicative of improper motive in nearly any action. Similarly,
continuing to take an unreasonable and unsupportable position
throughout litigation concerning the language of a relevant document
(such as a contract)—particularly if inconsistent or even contradicted
by other evidence—is likely to suggest an improper motive for the
litigation. Finally, misconduct during the course of litigation surely
happens in all types of cases, and in certain situations may evidence
that the litigation is being maintained for an improper purpose.
CONCLUSION
Maintaining objectively baseless litigation may violate the
antitrust laws. While it is beyond dispute that filing objectively
baseless litigation may be the basis for antitrust liability, there is little
case law on whether and when maintaining baseless litigation may be
so as well.
Antitrust concerns with maintaining baseless litigation extend far
beyond the pharmaceutical context.
Rather, the focus on
pharmaceutical cases is primarily due to the author’s familiarity with
the field, the importance of pharmaceuticals as a national issue, and the
common (though not universal) view that there is substantial
anticompetitive conduct occurring in the pharmaceutical industry.
Additionally, due to certain unique features of its regulatory context,
demonstrating anticompetitive effects of maintaining baseless litigation
is likely to be easier in pharmaceutical litigation than in other contexts.
Antitrust claims for maintaining baseless litigation are not likely
to become common—even in pharmaceutical cases. The difficulty of
meeting various, formidable substantive and procedural requirements
for antitrust liability will likely limit the viability of pleading and
proving such claims. Nevertheless, even if not-often used, it could be a
“big stick” to assist in combating anticompetitive conduct and deterring
frivolous litigation.

